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CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
Wrongful Death-Limitation on Recovery-Conflict of Laws
Plaintiff, a New York administratrix, brought suit against the defendant
airline company, a Massachusetts corporation, for the death of her husband
in a plane crash in Massachusetts. Plaintiff's cause of action was based on
the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act,' which provides that damages
be awarded with reference to the degree of defendant's culpability, and
which places minimum and maximum limits on recovery at $2,000 and
$15,000 respectively. The trial court refused to limit recovery to the

maximum provided in the Massachusetts statute.! The trial court's decision was reversed on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit,4 but on rehearing the Second Circuit, sitting in banc,
affirmed. The Second Circuit permitted the federal district court in New
York to apply a Massachusetts statute giving a cause of action for wrongful death, and at the same time allowed it to refuse, for reasons of New

York state policy, to follow a provision of the Massachusetts statute which
would limit recovery. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553
(1962).
The court based its decision on Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,' a
case brought in a New York state court which involved a wrongful death
action arising out of the same accident. In the Kilberg case the New York

Court of Appeals said in dicta only that the New York courts were to
disregard the Massachusetts limitation on recovery. Under Erie RR. v.

Tompkins' and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,' a federal court must apply the choice of law doctrine of the state in which it
8
sits. However the Erie doctrine does not apply to dicta. Realizing the
weakness in blind adherence to the dicta of a state court decision the court
Mass. Ann. Laws c. 229 § 2 (1949). This section of the Massachusetts General Statutes reads:
Damages for death by negligence of common carrier. If the proprietor of a common
carrier of passengers . . . cause the death of a passenger, he or it shall be liable in
the sum of not less than two thousand nor more than fifteen thousand dollars, to
be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant or of his
servants or agents, and recovered and distributed as provided in section one, and to
the use of the persons and in the proportions therein specified.
The statute has since been amended to raise the minimum recovery to $3,000 and the maximum
to $30,000. Mass. Acts 1962, c. 306. (effective Jan. 1, 1963).
'Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
4 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962). The court reasoned that
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution required a federal court in one state to
enforce the statutory wrongful death dollar limits of another state where the wrongful death
occurred. Even though the law of the forum has no limitation for recovery in wrongful death
the federal district court erred, according to the appellate court, in applying the conflict of laws
rule of the forum. This rule provided that the statutory limitation in the sister state's wrongful
death act would not be applied to citizens of its own state, despite the fact that the wrongful
death action itself was controlled by the substantive law of the foreign state.
59 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E. 2d 526, 211 N.Y.S. 2d 133 (1962).

6304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7313 U.S. 487 (1941).

' It was never imagined that it was the duty of the federal courts to follow dicta or to enter
into speculation as to what the state courts might decide. If the state court has not decided the
question it is the duty of the federal court to decide it in the light of the state law without regard to
dicta or the idiosyncrasies of state judges in the faith that a right decision would be that at
which the courts might ultimately arrive. 1A Moore, Federal Practice 5 0.309 [1-2] (2d ed. 1961).
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in the instant case made an elaborate justification of the ruling in the
Kilberg case. It stated that the "decision" in the state court was a proper
exercise of the state's power to develop conflict of laws doctrine, and that
the court's refusal to apply the limitation of recovery provision in the
Massachusetts statute was a constitutional exercise of such power not
prohibited by the full faith and credit clause.! The dicta in Kilberg is
contra to the decisions of most cases in which the problem of the proper
law to govern the damages recoverable in wrongful death actions has
been considered. The majority view has been that questions concerning the
measure of damages recoverable or limitations on such amounts are as
much a question of substantive law as is the right to recover for wrongful
death. Hence, these questions should be governed by the law of the place
where the fatal injury was inflicted." Previous New York cases have
followed the majority view. In Faron v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.," with a
fact situation almost identical to Kilberg and Pearson, a New York
executrix brought suit against the airline company under the Connecticut
Wrongful Death Act.'" The act contained a $20,000 limitation on the
amount of damages recoverable. In that case the court held the limitation
binding saying,
The law of the place where the wrong causing death occurred governs the
right of action for death. . . .The right to bring a death action is purely
statutory. It did not exist at common law and depends upon the existence of
a statute creating a right of action at the place where the "force impinged"
causing injury and death."3
The idea of lex loci delicti being determinative of damages was adopted
by the Second Circuit in Maynard v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 4 in another
action arising from the Connecticut crash.
Several theories have been used in the various decisions to justify the
application of the lex loci delicti to the measure and limitation of damages.
First, if each state were allowed to apply its own law of damages a different
law might be applied to each action resulting from a common disaster,
whereas application of the law of the lex loci delicti the same law will apply
to all those injured in a particular state. 5 Second, a constitutional question
is raised when one state refuses to give full faith and credit to the "public
acts" of another state."6 A sister state statute may be a "public act" within
the meaning of the full faith and credit clause and its implementing
'U.S. Const. art. IV § 1.
"°Northern Pac. R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co.,
194 U.S. 120 (1904); The statute of the place where fatal injury or wrongful death occurred
which limits the recovery to a specified amount will control to the exclusion of the law of the
forum which contains no such limitation. 15 A.L.R.2d 762. For a New York case holding contra
see Wooden v. Western N.Y. & Pac. R.R., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891). This decision was
later criticized by Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198
(1918) in which he stated that local public policy considerations should be narrowly confined.
He said, "Our own scheme of legislation may be different. We may even have no legislation on
the subject. That is not enough to show that public policy forbids us to enforce the foreign
right .... We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because
we deal with it otherwise at home."
" 84 N.Y.2d 568, 193 Misc. 395 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
"Conn. Gen. Stat. c. 319 § 1o5h (1945).
3
' Faron v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 84 N.Y.S. 2d 568, 570 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
14178 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949).
"Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W.Va. L.Q. 156, 165 (1930).
'o U.S. Const. art. IV § 1.
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statute.17 However, the United States Supreme Court has not made the
recognition of "public acts" uniform in all cases, and full faith and credit
probably does not require New York to apply the Massachusetts limitation. Even where full faith and credit does not apply, the tendency of
the courts has been to give as much credit to a sister state statute as it
would give to its own."8 Finally, the application of the measure of damages
of the lex fori encourages forum-shopping and the public policy advantages
derived from applying local law might not offset the basic need for
uniformity of decisions to which the law of conflicts is devoted."
To justify the Kilberg case the court in the instant case searched for
an exception to the general rule that the law of the place of the wrongful
act governs the extent of liability as well as its existence. The court began
its task by aligning the limitation on recovery with the statute of limitations and survival or abatement of actions. In the latter instances, courts
generally apply the law of the forum." In its comparison the court had
to characterize both statutes of limitation and survival or abatement of
actions as substantive law rather than procedural because of the decisions
which hold that damages are a part of the substantive right and not
merely a remedy. 1 The majority cited Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co. "
in which the forum was permitted to apply its own statute of limitation
to a death action arising in another state, even though the foreign wrongful death statute contained a special limitation on actions brought under
it. Such "built-in" limitations have frequently been considered part of
the substantive right." The fact that the United States Supreme Court in
the Wells case permitted this type of limitation to be ignored by the
forum shows an unwillingness to accord constitutional status to vested
right concepts of choice of law in tort cases. 4
The question of full faith and credit was more easily dismissed by the
court than the distinction between substantive and procedural law. It
correctly applied the view expressed in Alaskan Packers Ass'n v. IndustrialAcc. Comm.,"1 that, for purposes of full faith and credit, statutory
causes of action are generally subject to the general choice of law rules.
The court in Pearson surpassed the authorization given by Alaskan
Packers and accepted the Massachusetts law in part and rejected it in
part. In other words the majority gave some faith and credit to the
Massachusetts law but not full faith and credit. Professor Currie expressed
agreement with this approach in an article "The Constitution and Choice
1728 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958); First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. United Airlines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396
(1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
18 Bradford Electric Light & Power Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).

" Paulsen and Sovern, Public Policy In the Conflicts of Laws, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 696 (1956).
Allowing public policy to limit the application of certain conflict of laws rules is an idea which
threatens the fundamental concepts underlying the entire field of conflict of laws. This limitation
means that local policy could control a situation entirely foreign to the concerns of the forum.
" For statutes of limitation see Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); for
survival or abatement of actions see Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1961), and Grant
v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 41 Cal. 2d 859 (1953).
" Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916). The court said, "The question
of the proper measure of damage is inseparably connected with the right of action." See also,
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Babcock, 154
U.S. 190 (1884).
21345 U.S. 514 (1953).
2
The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
24 Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflicts of Laws, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 581 (1953).
2294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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of Law: Governmental Interest and Judicial Sanction.""6 Also in Watson
v. Employers Liability Corp." the United States Supreme Court recognized
that a single "transaction" may contain within itself several different
"issues" legitimately made subject to the law of more than one state.
The court's reasoning in the instant case failed to overcome the policy
reasons for applying the lex loci delicti, especially the desire to promote
uniformity of law and to prevent forum-shopping. However, an analysis
of the interests involved in this particular case justifies its decision. A
wrongful death statute manifests a state's recognition of the wrong
done to the dependents of the deceased and provides compensation for
their future welfare. If they are left impoverished they may become
burdens upon the state. Since the dependents here are residents, New
York is directly concerned with the outcome of the litigation." Bearing
in mind that the place of an airplane crash is completely fortuitous, the
results in terms of this policy seem to be just. A $15,000 limitation or
any other arbitrary limitation is an unreasonable standard by which to
measure the lives of all human beings. Furthermore it is doubtful that
the application of the Massachusetts statute in a case such as this, where
there is no negligence after the crash and no ground damage, would have
any real effect on any interest within that state.2" Should not a way be
sought to reach this desired result without opening the flood gates to
forum-shopping? The obvious solution is suggested by the Kilberg case,
i.e., adopting the contract approach by statute. Such legislation could be
enacted to provide that an airline company selling tickets within the state
impliedly obligates itself to take the passenger safely to his destination.
The breach of this duty would then give rise to a cause of action in contract in which the damages recoverable would be unlimited. A possible
alternative would be for Congress to provide for wrongful death recovery
by federal statute through its power over interstate commerce."0

Robert L. Trimble

Constitutional Law

-

Eminent Domain

-

Consequential Injury
Plaintiffs, owners of ten homes adjacent to Forbes Air Force Base in
Pauline, Kansas, brought suit against the United States under the Tucker
Act for an alleged appropriation of their property.' Their complaint stated
26 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9, 63 (1958).

348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954): Justice Black in the opinion of the court said,
"As a consequence of the modern practice of conducting widespread business activities
throughout the entire United States this court has in a series of cases held that more
states than one may seize hold of local activities which are part of multistate transactions and may regulate to protect interest of its own people even though other
phases of the same transaction might justify regulatory legislation in other states."
"SAlaskan Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
" Cf. Stumberg, Conflict of Laws S 202 (2d ed. 1951).
5
" Comment, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 723 (1961).
'The Tucker Act provides that an action may be maintained against the United States for a
claim "not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract
with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1952).
27
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that the operation and maintenance of the Base caused interferences with
the use and enjoyment of their property sufficient in law to constitute
a "taking" for which just compensation was due.' The property owners,
who acquired their homes prior to the enlargement of the Base to accommodate jet aircraft,' did not rely upon flights over their homes to
sustain their claims. The interferences which served as the bases of their
complaint were (1) the violent vibrations and sound waves which were
transmitted from the jet engines; (2) the exhaust fumes and heavy
black smoke which were emitted from the aircraft and which blew over
on their houses; and (3) the frequent operation of the jets at high RPM
ranges which endangered their health and safety.' The trial court found
that the diminution in value of the ten homes ranged from $4,700 to
$8,800. Held: the interferences about which the Plaintiffs complain are
not severe enough to be considered a "taking." In order to maintain an
action for damages under the Fifth Amendment there must be either a
direct encroachment on the property by a physical object, or government
action so complete as to deprive the owner of "all or most '' of his interest
in the land. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 955 (1963).
The power of eminent domain permits the sovereign or his delegate7
to condemn lands for the public use without the owner's consent.! It is
nothing more than an inherent political right founded upon grounds of
common interest and necessity to preserve the sovereign's existence in
perpetuity.9 Because it is an inherent attribute of sovereignty no recognition is required in the Constitution." The exercise of this power by the
United States Government is only restricted by the provisions found
within the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution." This amendment
places the economic loss created by the exercise of the power upon the
public rather than upon those from whom the property is taken." It is
evident that the framers of the Constitution injected this provision only
to protect the elements which they deemed essential to the value of
property. Therefore, the government "takes" property when it destroys
one of those essential property rights." Thus it is the character of the
invasion, and not the amount of damages which determines whether the
'U.S. Const. amend. V: "nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
a Aircraft movements averaged about 4,000 monthly, and of these, 70% were jets.
' In the maintenance operations jet engines were run at various power settings ranging from 50%
to 100%. During a typical month the engines were operated for 84 hours in the 100% RPM
range, at which time the sound pressure level on the plaintiff's property varied from 90 to 117
decibels. The Air Force recommends that their personnel use ear plugs when the sound pressure
level reaches 85 decibles, and requires their use at or above 95 decibles. Substantial ear damage may
result from failure to use the plugs.
'Stated in terms of percentages the diminution in value ranged from 55.3% to 40.8%.
6United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
'I Nichols, Eminent Domain § 3.1 (3d ed. 1950).
'Scott v. Toledo, 36 Fed. 385 (N.D. Ohio 1888); Dept. of Public Works and Bldg. v.
Kirkendall, 415 111. 214, 112 N.E.2d 611 (1953).
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876).
50 James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 302 U.S. 134 (1937); United States v. Finn, 127
F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
1'See supra note 2.
"United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
'aSpann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
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land has been taken. " Nevertheless, as the cases demonstrate, the damages
must be substantial."
The important questions to be decided in cases arising under the Fifth
Amendment are whether there was a "taking," and if so, whether that
which was taken was "property." The courts have long recognized that
the government may act so as to deprive citizens of their ownership
rights without taking the physical property itself. 6 In this area the courts
are careful to distinguish between damages which are only an incidental

result of lawful governmental action, 7 and those acts which substantially

impair a person's right to use, enjoy and dispose of his private property. 8

This doctrine was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in two
9 the
earlier decisions. In Baltimore and P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church,"
Supreme Court held that there had been a taking of the plaintiff's church
as a direct result of the disturbances created by the operation of the
defendant's engine house. The interference was of sufficient magnitude
to destroy completely the value of the building as a place of worship. The
court ruled that the use to which the defendant put his land was unreasonable, and that although the plaintiff might use the building for
other purposes, there was no requirement that he do so." Later, in
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,"2 the Court held that even though
Congress could legalize what would otherwise be a public nuisance, it
could not confer immunity from action for a private nuisance which
amounted to a taking of private property. It further stated that no such
grant of authority affected the claim of a private citizen for damages for
any special inconvenience and discomfort not experienced by the public at
large. However, the Court in establishing this remedy did not set out any
rigid distinctions between that which is "taken" and that which is merely
"damaged." The decisions have been governed by the peculiar circumstances in each case.
As a result of these two decisions many states have inserted into their
constitutions provisions which allow recovery for land which has been
"taken" or "damaged" by governmental interference." However, in those
14Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
" Ibid.
"eUnited States v. Kansas City, 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316
(1917).
"rDamages which are an incidental result of lawful government action, without any direct
invasion of private property, are consequential; they do not constitute a taking under the Fifth
Amendment. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878); Nunnally v. United States,
239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956); Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958).
"8It is generally held that when a part of an owner's parcel or track of land is taken for a
public improvement the owner is entitled to be compensated for the part taken and for consequential
damage to the part not taken even though the consequential damage is of a kind suffered by the
public at large. State Highway Comm. v. Bloom, 77 S.D. 494, 93 N.W.2d 572 (1958).
" 108 U.S. 317 (1883).
See also Cerigheno v. State, 75 Cal. App. 2d 217, 370 P.2d 694
(1962).
20108 U.S. at 330.
" Plaintiff alleged damages to his property resulting from the maintenance of a railroad
operation by the defendant company. The defendant's railroad ran into a tunnel near, but not
adjacent to, the plaintiff's property. An exhaust fan was constructed to drive the smoke and
fumes out of the tunnel and directed them in such a manner that they came on and across the
plaintiff's property. This action by the plaintiff was founded on nuisance. The Court held that
Congress could not grant immunity where the private nuisance was of such special inconvenience
as to amount to a taking of private property. 233 U.S. 545 (1914).
"2 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.44 (3d ed. 1950); Kansas was the only state in the Tenth
Circuit which did not have the "damaged" provision.
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jurisdictions such as Kansas which have not adopted the 'damaged" provision, the courts are bound through the application of the Fourteenth
the Supreme Court's decisions in Richards and
Amendment 3 to consider
24
Baltimore and P.R.R.
The instant case represents nothing more than an attempt by the
Plaintiffs to place the interference created by the Air Base within the
definition of acts which will constitute a taking. The district court in
deciding against Batten indicated that the above decisions were of small
significance in light of the Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Causby.6 In Causby, the Court found that there could be no taking of
private property unless the flights in question were directly over the
property and were so low and frequent as to be a direct interference with
the enjoyment and use of the land. The lower court reasoned that
Causby had considered the interference created by the aircraft as a
"legalized nuisance."2 Therefore, without a physical trespass onto what
is considered the dominion of the property owner there cannot be a
"taking" in the constitutional sense.
Judge Breitenstein, who delivered the majority opinion in the instant
case, did not exclude from consideration the doctrine set out in Richards.
He denied recovery solely upon the ground that the disturbances were
not great enough to be considered substantial. He based this conclusion
upon two important factors. First, the interferences of which the Plaintiffs complained were considered as only general in nature because they
were of the same character as those experienced in varying degrees in the
surrounding area. Second, the Plaintiffs did not show that their homes
were made uninhabitable because of the activities at the Base. Therefore,
the majority reasoned, there had not been a deprivation of "all or most"
of the Plaintiff's interest, and the interferences must be considered as only
consequential. The fact that the homes had diminished in market value
had no effect in determining whether the property had been taken."
The majority opinion did not overlook the Supreme Court's decisions in
Causby and Griggs. The plaintiff had contended that since recovery was
permitted for sound and shock waves travelling vertically, it should also
be allowed for such waves travelling laterally. The court rejected this
argument merely by stating that it was unable to find any decision or
interpretation of the theory set forth in Causby and Griggs which would
indicate that it could be applied without an actual physical trespass. "
Chief Judge Murrah in his dissenting opinion stated that the court's
definition of what is to be considered "substantial" is far too rigid in
light of the facts presented in the instant case. His language in this connection is significant:
22 U.S. Const. amend. XIV: "Nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty or property . . .

without due process of law ....
' 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 4.1 (3d ed. 1950).
" Brief for Appellant, p. 14, Batten v. United States, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
26 328 U.S. 256 (1946); See also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
2'7 328 U.S. at 266.
28
Brief for Appellant, p. 19, Batten v. United States, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
'9 See supra note 14.
" Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Herring v. United States, 162
F. Supp. 769 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Highland Park v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
United States v. 257.654 Acres of Land, 72 F. Supp. 903 (D. Hawaii 1947).
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I must inquire at what point the interference rises to the dignity of a
"taking?" Is it when the window glass rattles, or when it falls out; when
the smoke suffocates the inhabitants, or merely makes them cough; when the
noise makes family conversation difficult, or when it stifles it entirely? In
other words, does the "taking" occur when the property interest is totally
destroyed, or when it is substantially diminished?
He seems to believe that there can be a "taking" of the property at some
time before it is rendered completely uninhabitable. The court should
strike a balance between the interests of the State and the private property
owner. He states that there is no reason to grant recovery under the
doctrine of Causby and then to deny compensation in the instant case,
especially when the economic interests which have been invaded are of the
same variety as those in Causby.
The views of the dissenting opinion were further emphasized31 by the
Supreme Court of Oregon in its decision in Thornburg v. Port of
s
Portland."
That decision was handed down after the Tenth Circuit had
rendered its opinion in Batten, but before the Supreme Court had denied
certiorari. The question before that court was similar to the question in
the instant case. The Oregon high court contended that the rationale
used by the majority in Batten was circular. They felt that in effect all
the majority in Batten had said was that "there was no taking because
the damages are consequential, and the damages are consequential because there was no taking."33 The court emphasized that the test to be
applied under such circumstances was one of reasonableness based upon
a balancing of the interests of the parties concerned. It concluded that
Causby was not decided upon the ground of physical trespass. The extent
of the vibrations and noise were considered determinative of the question
of taking. The court in this regard stated:
It is sterile formality to say that the government takes an easement in private
property when it repeatedly sends aircraft directly over the land at altitudes
so low to render land unusuable by its owner, but does not take an easement
when it sends aircraft a few feet to the right or left of the perpendicular
boundaries. The line which marks the land owner's right to deflect surface
invaders has no particular relevance when invasion is a noise nuisance.
The decision in Batten practically forces every landowner into litigation to determine whether he has a cause of action. In other words, the
uncertainty of what should be considered "substantial" interference may
lead to a great many lawsuits, each turning on its particular facts. Note
however that this decision did not deal with any suggestion of tort
liability. By bringing suit under the Tucker Act only the property owners
were precluded from any possible relief based either on nuisance or trespass." There was no indication by the court that the Plaintiffs in the
instant case could not have asked for relief under the Federal Tort Claims
" "In view of the importance of the question presented in the Batten case, and in view of
the strong dissent by the chief judge, it would be premature to speculate now upon the final
direction the federal courts will take. We believe the dissenting view in the Batten case presents
the better-reasoned analysis of the principles involved, and that if the majority view in the Batten
case can be defended it must be defended frankly upon the ground that considerations of public
policy justify the result: i.e., that private rights must yield to public convenience in this class of
cases." 376 P.2d at 104.
" Ore. -,
376 P.2d 100 (1962).
33376

P.2d at 104.

34306 F.2d at $83.
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Act."' Tort relief has been somewhat limited in the field of Air Law
because of the possible conflict with the Government's power to enact
air traffic rules.3 Since Congress has declared that any altitude above 500
feet over open areas and 1,000 feet over congested areas is public domain,"7
courts are reluctant to grant injunctive relief which would have the
effect of imposing a minimum altitude on flight above that height."
Mandatory injunctions generally will not be allowed unless the court
determines that health and safety are imperiled and that an injunction is
the only possible remedy."9 On the other hand money damages should not
adversely effect rules which are designed to promote flight safety.
In an action for damages based on trespass there must be evidence not
only that the aircraft passed over the land in question, but also that
there was an unlawful invasion of the "immediate reaches" of the owner's
property."' Since the doctrine of ad coelum4' is no longer in use, it will
be necessary to prove that the airplane actually invaded the space which
the owner might reasonably use and occupy." Most courts in considering
the question of damages have been more liberal in granting recovery under
a doctrine of nuisance." Whether there is a cause of action for nuisance
usually depends upon whether the interference which the landowner has
suffered was reasonable under the circumstances." The fact that the airport is being operated properly or that its operation constitutes only a
reasonable use of the land upon which it is located is of no moment.
If the rationale of the majority is followed with any uniformity, the
effect which the decision will project into this area of the law would
be substantial. It would definitely restrict the doctrine set forth in Causby.
The court in the instant case indicated that relief would be granted only
if there were a direct physical invasion and a frequent interference with
the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land. While the decision did not
establish any firm definition of what would be considered "substantial"
disturbance, it will require property owners in the future to take a hard
look at the facts to determine if their injury is more serious than that
described in the facts of the Batten case.
William W. Rodgers, Jr.
2672 (1958).
3' 60 Stat. 428, 28 USC
1301 (1958).
2672 Stat. 739, 49 USC
37 14 C.F.R. § 60.17 (1947).
5
" Calkins, The Landowner and the Aircraft-1958, 25 J. Air L. & Com. 373 (1958).
3See Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal.2d 825, 243 P.2d 497 (1952); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey,
193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. 2d 245 (1945); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817
(1934).
40"We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet it is obvious that if the landowner
is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches
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